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ORR & OCT Report



21 February 1966 25X1

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

BUILDUP OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES
CONTINUES AFTER RESUMPTION OF AIR ATTACKS

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

JCS review(s) completed.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 February 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Buildup of Vietnamese Communist Forces Continues
After Resumption of Air Attacks

SUMMARY

Since the resumption on 31 January of the US air attacks against North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese have shown no weakening of their determination to maintain the flow of men and supplies into South Vietnam. Hanoi radio in recent broadcasts has pledged its all-out support to the revolution in South Vietnam. Private statements of the North Vietnamese leaders indicate a willingness and ability to support the war in South Vietnam for 20 to 30 years, if necessary.

The infiltration of PAVN forces continues.

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The DRV has an apparent capability of training and infiltrating at least 50,000 men annually, or the equivalent of 36 regiments, without impairing the strength of its armed forces in North Vietnam.

There has been a decline in the aggressiveness of Communist military forces in South Vietnam since the end of 1965. Although the total number of armed attacks increased by 22 percent from December through January, the number of large-scale Communist attacks has been declining. Regimental strength attacks declined from 4 in November to 1 in December and none

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in January. Battalion-strength attacks declined from 8 in November and 7 in December to 3 in January. Recent Allied operations have disrupted Communist planning and thrown Communist forces off balance and made it increasingly difficult for them to mount mass surprise attacks.

There has been no abatement of the logistic buildup since the resumption of the air attacks. Although daylight activity has been reduced, repair and construction programs continue at a high rate. At least 80,000 workers are involved in the maintenance of lines of communication in Military Region IV. The productivity of these workers has been increased by the introduction of large amounts of equipment and construction materials. At least two new roads are under construction in MR IV, and an intensified effort to improve inland waterways and canals is also under way. Intensive reconstruction activity is also taking place in Laos. New road construction in Laos centers on the construction of a third by-pass around the Mu Gia Pass choke point, the possible construction of a new border crossing point south of Mu Gia Pass, and the improvement of roads and trails further south near the border of South Vietnam.

The Communists used the bombing pause to increase the flow of supplies through Laos to South Vietnam. In spite of the renewed air attacks they have been able to maintain this increased flow of supplies. Supplies moving into MR IV in January and February appear to be at the high levels noted in the last quarter of 1965. There is apparently a continuing high priority in the use of inland water transport and an increasing use of coastal water transport. Truck traffic through Laos both during and since the bombing pause has been almost twice the level of the same period a year ago. From 70-90 tons per day has been moved into Laos in January and February compared with an average of 35 tons per day during the 1965 dry season. Road watch reports in February indicate increasing use of the Mu Gia by-pass rather than Route 12/23 as the main route for this traffic.

Some 50-70 tons of the supplies being moved daily into Laos probably are moved forward to South

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Vietnam. This amount is far in excess of present VC/PAVN requirements of some 12 tons per day. It is adequate to support both a substantial buildup of VC/PAVN forces and an intensification of combat, or to make significant additions to stockpiles in South Vietnam.

Recent photography [] confirm the use of Cambodian territory as a base and sanctuary area and as an infiltration route. At least 6 way stations have been identified along an apparent infiltration route in Cambodia. Photography also seems to confirm prisoner reports of Communist warehouses and installations associated with PAVN infiltration and logistic operations.

I. Hanoi's Political Reaction

All political indications from North Vietnam since the renewal of the air attacks on 31 January point to a determination to continue fully supporting the insurgents in South Vietnam with men and materiel. On 15 February, for example, Hanoi radio broadcast a congratulatory message to the Viet Cong armed forces on their fifth anniversary which pledged that the North Vietnamese will continue to "give wholehearted and all-out support to the revolution in South Vietnam in all fields, and will stand shoulder to shoulder" with the Viet Cong in fighting against the Allied forces.

Hanoi has never expressly admitted that it is covertly aiding the insurgents with arms and men. But implicit pledges of armed support, such as the one above, have become more frequent in the past year, during which time regular North Vietnamese Army units have been deployed into the fighting in South Vietnam. In private, North Vietnamese leaders have continued to stress their willingness and ability to support and aid the war in Vietnam for "20 to 30 years" if necessary.

II. The Infiltration of Personnel

Additional groups of infiltrators have probably arrived in South Vietnam since the resumption of the bombings of North Vietnam. Although this has not

been confirmed, there is indirect evidence that a further influx is taking place or will occur soon.

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The interrogation of prisoners indicates that it has taken about six to ten weeks for most of the North Vietnamese Army elements who have infiltrated the South to complete their trek from the DRV. It is therefore probable that the infiltrating units

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_____ began arriving in South Vietnam in mid-February, some two weeks after the resumption of the bombings of North Vietnam. Based on past experience, however, it may be several months before there is confirmation of the arrival of any new units since the termination of the bombing pause. There was, for example, a four-month delay in the confirmation of the entry of the first PAVN regiment in South Vietnam in December 1964.

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If the entry of [] PAVN infiltrators during February and March of 1966 is eventually confirmed, the total number of confirmed PAVN personnel in South Vietnam will be around 20,000 . . . The presence of eight PAVN regiments and one anti-aircraft battalion totaling 14,050 men in South Vietnam has already been confirmed. US military authorities in Saigon (MACV) carry two other PAVN regiments--possibly numbering 4,000 men--as unconfirmed, but possibly present in the South.

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Numerous reports from prisoners, defectors and captured documents indicate the presence of PAVN units in the South in addition to those noted above. The scarcity of information on these units, and the possibility of duplication with confirmed units, has prevented their acceptance in the possible category. The weight of the evidence and past experience, however, suggests that the presence of some of these units will eventually be confirmed.

The following are the confirmed, possible, and reported PAVN units in South Vietnam:

CONFIRMED

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
95th Regiment	2,000
101st Regiment	1,200
32nd Regiment	1,500
18th Regiment	1,500
250th Regiment	1,000
33rd Regiment (also 101B)	2,000
66th Regiment	1,450
195th AA Battalion	400
Quyet Tam Regiment	3,000
Total Confirmed Strength	14,050

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POSSIBLE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
42nd (B9) Regiment	2,000
36th Regiment of the 308th Division	2,000
Total Possible Strength	4,000

REPORTED

<u>DIVISIONS</u>	<u>REGIMENTS</u>	<u>BATTALIONS</u>
Elements of	18 "B"	19th Transp.
304th	44th	952nd Inf
308th	332nd	13th AA.
320th	108th (308th Div)	365th Inf.
324th		602nd Inf.
		15th AA
		6200 Arty

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The total number of confirmed or probable infiltrators including PAVN and all others, through the end of 1965 is now slightly over 66,000.

III. North Vietnamese Capability to Sustain or Step Up Infiltration

DRV statements and reports of visitors to North Vietnam indicate that large-scale mobilization of manpower has been under way in the DRV this year. Most of the 4 million draft-age males in the DRV have now either been enrolled in the regular armed forces, paramilitary organizations, or labor repair and maintenance battalions.

Hanoi will probably continue, at least through 1966, to draw both on these mobilized personnel, and on regular North Vietnamese Army units for the manpower to make up infiltration units. Subsequently, Hanoi will be able to draw on the remainder of the mobilized pool and on the approximately 175,000 males who reach draft age each year in North Vietnam. Of these, slightly over 100,000 will be physically fit for military duty. Thus, the North Vietnamese should have no difficulty, from the standpoint of available manpower, in sustaining the at least 20,000-man rate of covert infiltration into South Vietnam which was maintained during the past year. This should still

leave adequate manpower for the strengthening of the DRV armed forces remaining in North Vietnam.

Hanoi should probably also have no difficulty, from the standpoint of training capability, in sustaining the infiltration rate of 1965. There is considerable evidence that the North Vietnamese have been utilizing certain of their organic regular army regiments to provide the facilities and staff for training infiltrators during 1965. There are 38 infantry regiments in the North Vietnamese Army, of which 15 are considered as reserve. The remaining 23 could be used to train infiltration cadre, although it is believed probable that only half of these regiments would be assigned this duty. Assuming a four-month training cycle involving 12 PAVN regiments, it is conceivable that the PAVN could train annually up to 36 regiments of 1,500 men each for infiltration. This would be on the order of 50,000 men. Unfortunately, conflicting information from prisoners and defectors in South Vietnam makes it difficult to estimate the length of the present cycle with confidence. Some prisoners, for example, have indicated that they received only four to six weeks training.

IV. The Present Combat Rate of Vietnamese Communist Forces

MACV now carries approximately 110 enemy battalions in the confirmed order of battle holdings for South Vietnam, including the PAVN units. It has been estimated that the Viet Cong in South Vietnam are capable of recruiting and training at least two new battalions, plus 2,500 replacements per month, during 1966. This force would be in addition to the infiltrators which Hanoi is believed capable of training and dispatching to South Vietnam during the current year. In sum, it is believed that the Viet Cong/PAVN forces in South Vietnam could receive reinforcements from both sources at a rate of 16 battalion equivalents per month during 1966.

This rate of growth probably will be substantially reduced as a result of Communist casualties. During each of the last two quarters of 1965, it is estimated that the Communists sustained losses equivalent to some 30 battalions or 15,000 men. If an increased rate of combat by Communist forces occurs this year, this loss rate could rise by as much as four or five battalion equivalents each quarter. Based on this figure and the estimated Viet Cong/PAVN input capability, the total strength of Vietnamese Communist main force units in South Vietnam by the end of 1966 could be in the neighborhood of 155 battalions.

During 1965 each main force battalion is estimated to have engaged in combat an average of less than one day per month. Since the end of 1965, statistics from COMUSMACV suggest that the

rate of large-scale Viet Cong initiated attacks has been declining even though there has been some increase (22 percent from December to January) in the total number of armed attacks. Regimental-strength attacks declined from 4 in November to 1 in December and none in January. Battalion-strength attacks declined from 8 in November and 7 in December to 3 in January. Moreover, since the November battle between US and PAVN troops in western Pleiku Province, there has been a general tendency for Communist units to avoid large-scale engagements with allied forces.

This apparent decline in Communist aggressiveness may well reflect previously noted patterns of taking a period of rest and replacement following intensified combat while positioning and preparatory measures are under way for new large-scale operations. There have in fact been numerous indications of such a transitional phase in recent weeks and months. However, detection of these developments and movements has permitted several recent Allied operations--including at least five major combined operations and a series of South Vietnamese operations in the delta--to move into suspected target areas with spoiling operations which have almost certainly disrupted Communist planning and thrown Communist forces off balance. MACV estimates that, these ground operations, combined with B-52 and tactical air strikes against Viet Cong base areas, will make it increasingly difficult for the Viet Cong/PAVN units to mass and retain the element of surprise.

There is no present evidence that the Communists are abandoning their previous strategy of progressing toward a more conventional army, or that they are breaking up divisional or regimental units into smaller operational forces. Thus, for the immediate future at least, they will continue where favorable opportunities present themselves, to attempt to conduct large-scale though costly attacks. They will almost certainly continue a simultaneous pattern of widespread harassment and terror tactics.

If MACV's assumption is correct, the rate of expenditure of materiel by the Communist forces is likely to be determined more by the rate of force expansion than by an intensified rate of Communist-initiated combat in the next several months. However, another period of intensified activity, prior to or with the advent of a Viet Cong summer campaign,

cannot be ruled out on the results of Allied actions to date. Despite a general failure of recent Allied operations to trap and engage sizable Communist units, heavy engagement of Viet Cong forces by Allied troops may increase. This should mean that Communist battalions will be committed to combat at a rate at least comparable to, if not above, present levels. It is also possible that, with increased instances of allied capture or destruction of food and ammunition stores, the Viet Cong may be forced to draw down existing stockpiles.

Total Viet Cong - initiated incidents of all kinds presently range from about 650-800 weekly. Some 20-25 percent of these appear to be antiaircraft firing incidents, and at least another 25 percent involve harassing fire with small arms or mortars. Armed attacks have been averaging 10-12 per week (13 for the past two weeks), most of them small-scale.

V. The Logistic Buildup

A. Activity in Military Region IV

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At least 80,000 workers are currently involved in all types of construction on lines of communications in MR IV. Approximately 21,000 are working on new road construction in the Vinh - Ha Tinh area. Dredging operations on inland waterways between Hoang Mai and Vinh continue with about 14,000 workers, an increase of 8,000 since December 1965.

The additional amounts of equipment and materials brought into MR IV during the pause in bombings have increased the productivity of these workers. It is believed new pumps for dredging are now being used on canal projects. Moreover, bulldozers, scrapers and mobile cranes were moved to the road construction sites before the Vietnamese New Year. Timber from logging camps in MR IV and cement from Hanoi delivered during January have augmented the stock of bridge repair materials.

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In addition to the continued restoration of stream and river crossings on existing roads since resumption of the bombings, at least two new roads are currently under construction. One road under construction from Route 15 towards 1A in the vicinity

of Ha Tinh will provide an alternate route to the southern part of 15 from 1A. Another road under construction west of Vinh proceeding north from Route 8 will provide a by-pass of Vinh and parts of Route 15 north of Route 8.

the additional construction resources obtained during the pause in bombing may speed up their completion.

All the river crossings on the Hanoi-Vinh rail line were restored to some form of limited capacity service during the pause in bombing and attempts are now being made to increase the load carrying capacity of these crossings. The temporary rail bridge at Qui Vinh was originally restored to a capacity of 25 gross tons per rail car. Work crews are now strengthening this temporary structure to allow loads up to 40 gross tons per car. Other rail bridges along this line that have been restored temporarily are probably being reinforced for greater capacity.

Although dredging work on canals and inland waterways in MR IV is done annually, the present level of effort indicates an intention to make greater use of this system of transportation. Dredging efforts continue on canals and inland waterways between Thanh Hoa and Vinh. These rivers and canals often parallel existing roads, and thus will provide a natural alternate route if the roads are interdicted.

B. Supply Routes in Laos

The increased bombing of supply routes in Laos during the pause in bombing of North Vietnam forced the Communists to do a greater amount of restoration work on roads and stream crossings. New road construction continues, however, with the emphasis upon by-passes around the Mu Gia Pass choke point and improvements to trails farther south near the border of South Vietnam. A second section of the original by-pass of Mu Gia was completed in January to the east of Route 12 and clearing operations are now under way for another by-pass west of the choke point on Route 12. Restoration of stream crossing on Route 23 north of its junction with 911 continues. Additional by-passes have been completed around the Tchepone River Bridge on Route 9. Although there is

evidence of rapid repair of a bridge on Route 8 at Nape Pass, it is believed that the routes through the Mu Gia Pass area are considered by the North Vietnamese as their major supply route to South Vietnam.

A new road was observed under construction in late January in a northeasterly direction from Route 911. Although its final destination cannot be determined at present, it could eventually become another border crossing from North Vietnam south of Mu Gia Pass. Further south there is road construction under way between Chavane on Route 165 and Route 16 east of Attopeu. This construction involves the improvement of an existing trail net; and recent track activity indicates the work may be complete, thus providing about 50 miles of motorable road farther south on the supply route.

VI. The Movement of Supplies

A. In Military Region IV

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There were additional indications during January that large barges and lighters were being towed to Ben Thuy from the Haiphong area by seagoing tugs on a regular basis. Although it is difficult to quantify the amount of traffic that moved into Ben Thuy from Haiphong and possibly China during January,

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it would appear that the over-all level of monthly coastal water traffic moving into MR IV increased substantially in January over the 1965 level. In February pilots have reported sightings of numerous cargo barges and motorized cargo junks both north and south of the Vinh area, indicating that the high level of traffic probably is continuing.

A curious, and perhaps significant, development is the possible transloading of supplies from Chinese Communist ships to small North Vietnamese watercraft headed for MR IV. During recent months Chinese merchant shipping patterns to the DRV have deviated from the normal pattern. At least two Chinese ships are known to have offloaded cargo at Cam Pha and Hon Gai, both coal ports that normally do not handle general cargo, and then proceeded to Haiphong to pick up cargo. The possibility that irregular Chinese shipping patterns and North Vietnam's efforts to supply MR IV are related is strong, but at this point it is not possible to state with certainty that such a supply system is actually in operation.

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[redacted] rail traffic on the Hanoi-Vinh line continued in January on a level at least equal to and probably much greater than that observed in December 1965 when about 10,000 tons were moved south by rail. Through rail traffic was restored on the Hanoi-Vinh line during early January and daily through trains were operating between Thanh Hoa and Vinh. Over 100 box cars were observed in the Hoang Mai area on 5 and 6 February. The tramway operating between Duc Tho and Tan Ap apparently moved about 2,200 tons of traffic in January, about the same amount as it did in December.

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There is no indication as to how much tonnage was carried by inland waterways or trucks in January or thus far in February. [redacted]

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LAOS TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED BY ROADWATCH TEAMS 24 December 1965 - 16 February 1966





Figure 1

- a. These observations were made on the northern end of route 911, about 15 miles south of the junction with route 23.
b. These observations were made on the southern end of route 911, about 6 miles north of the junction with route 9.
*c. On most days during 9 to 14 February, the road was not covered for a complete 24-hour period. Therefore, it is likely that during this period additional trucks moved south in this area.

* ** Road under observation, but no trucks sighted. (Blanks indicate road was not under observation)

Photography taken during the pause in US airstrikes revealed a high level of truck traffic on Routes 15 and 1A leading toward Laos. Although aerial photography of 1 February revealed approximately 100 military vehicles within the Mu Gia Pass area, only a relatively few trucks have been sighted by pilots in February. While it is not possible to quantify traffic by inland water and truck transport in MR IV since 1 January, it would appear that the level of activity is at least as high as in December.

B. Truck Traffic in Laos

During the bombing pause in North Vietnam from 24 December through 30 January, bombing on the routes in Laos was increased considerably. Nevertheless, the level of Communist truck traffic moving south on Routes 23 and 911 averaged a total of 29 trucks per day--twice the average of 15 trucks per day moving south in this area during the same period one year earlier. Since the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam on 31 January, coverage of Route 911 has been so incomplete that it is impossible to estimate with any degree of confidence the level of truck traffic moving south on this route. A few days of coverage during February of the new Mu Gia by-pass road, however, indicates that southbound traffic entering Laos is probably continuing at about the same level as during January (See Chart for day-to-day traffic on the Panhandle routes). Based on the information that about half the trucks observed on the by-pass were identified as ZIL-157s with a capacity of 5 tons, it is estimated that the trucks carried an average 3 tons compared with an estimated average of 2 tons per truck one year ago. Thus, truck traffic in January and thus far in February may have carried between 70 and 90 tons per day compared with an average of about 35 tons per day during the 1965 dry season.

On 12 February the first count by a road-watch team of truck traffic on the new Mu Gia by-pass became available although villagers had previously reported that trucks were moving over a by-pass in the area. From the by-pass trucks can move west on Route 12, or possibly on Route 121 which may be truckable, or south on Routes 23 or 911. (See the attached map). In January an average

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of 8 trucks per day was observed moving west on Route 12, an average of 5 trucks moving south on Route 23, and an average of 24 moving south on Route 911. Thus far in February about the same level of traffic has been observed on Route 12 but daily coverage of Route 23 has reportedly revealed no trucks moving south and only a few trucks moving north. Coverage of Route 911 during February has consisted of only a few hours on some days between 10 and 15 February on the northern part of the route and only three days on the southern part of the route near Route 9. Thus the destination of the trucks observed on the by-pass cannot be determined. Some could have moved west on Route 121 but it is more likely that they moved down Route 911 unobserved. It is also possible that they could have stopped at supply dumps before reaching the locations of the observers.

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VII. Relation of the Logistic Buildup to VC/PAVN Requirements

A. In Terms of the Current Scale of Combat

The external requirement for logistic support for the VC/PAVN main force units under the present level of fighting is estimated to be about 12 tons per day. Even if the scale of fighting does not increase significantly, there are indications that the requirement for external logistic support will increase gradually during 1966. The reequipping of additional VC main force battalions with the new family of 7.62-mm. weapons, the introduction of 120-mm. mortars into main force units, and the use of PAVN antiaircraft artillery units in South Vietnam will increase the daily requirement for ammunition and to some extent the requirement for other supplies.

The actual amount of tonnage moving through the Laotian Panhandle since the latter part of December 1965 has probably averaged from 70 to 90 tons per day. The Communist troops stationed in the area of Laos south of Route 12 during the 1965 dry season probably required an average of about 15 tons per day of logistic support from outside sources. During the summer and fall of 1965 additional numbers of troops were observed moving south into this area of Laos, so the present daily requirement may actually be more than 15 tons. Thus an excess of about 50 to 70 tons

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probably is available for movement to South Vietnam. This excess is substantially more than the estimated present daily requirement of 12 tons and is probably more than sufficient to take care of the increased fire power presently being introduced into Communist main force units: as well as providing some stockpiling for future operations or requirements during the rainy season.

B. In Terms of Future Scales of Combat or Increased Forces

If the total strength of VC/PAVN main force units in South Vietnam approaches 155 battalions by the end of 1966 and combat remains at essentially the 1965 levels, the daily requirement for external logistic support will be in the order of 20 tons per day. Since the Communists are presently moving into or through Laos an amount of tonnage well in excess of this requirement they could support this level of buildup and fighting on a sustained basis.

If the total strength of the Communist forces in South Vietnam increases to 155 main force battalions and the level of fighting increases to the point where each battalion is fighting once in every three days, there would be a substantial increase in dependence on external sources for logistic support. Under these circumstances the requirement for external logistic support would increase to about 170 tons per day. To bring in this amount of tonnage on a sustained basis over a long period of time would place a heavy burden on the Communist logistic system in North Vietnam and Laos. We believe, however, that the throughput capacity of the Laotian route system is at least 400 tons per day during the dry season.* Also, because of the conservative nature of the methodology used for computing road capacities, it is quite possible that more than

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*During the rainy season the throughput capacity drops to about 100 tons per day.

400 tons per day can be delivered on a sustained basis to the South Vietnamese border if the Communists make an all-out effort.

These road capacity estimates are for sustained movements of at least 90 days duration, and they make no provision for crash movements or for various field expedients that the Communists have often employed in the past. For example, when short-term operational moves of 3 or 4 days are considered, the road capacity may be doubled or even tripled. At any rate, it is evident that the current and projected dry season capacity of the route system through Laos is much more than adequate to provide for the amount of tonnage required by Communist main force units in South Vietnam even if the level of these forces increases by nearly 40 percent and the intensity of combat reaches a scale of more than ten times its present level.

VIII. Developments in Cambodia

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25X1 [redacted] traveled from South Vietnam across the border to the Lomphat area in December 1965 and January 1966 reported seeing large numbers of Viet Cong troops on the trip. Reports [redacted] have not always been reliable, but this information may be partially confirmed by a recent analysis of aerial photographs of the area. Photos of a part of this area show that some trenches have been dug. Aerial photographs also show numerous trails along the border area from the general area of Camp Le Rolland north to Route 19, which are believed to indicate Viet Cong activity, because there are not many natives in the area and the trails are too well used to indicate use only by Cambodians. The border area generally south from Camp Le Rolland has not been subjected to photographic analysis.

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B. As an Infiltration Route

Recent photographic analysis shows a network of roads and trails, which may be or soon will be motorable, leading south from Route 165 in Laos to the tri-border area of Cambodia. This network may connect with the infiltration route taken by some PAVN infiltrators. The routes probably lie on both sides of the Cambodian - South Vietnamese border. Information received from interrogation of Communist prisoners has given some details of these infiltration routes and of Communist storage areas in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

In the spring of 1965 some PAVN personnel reported that they infiltrated through Cambodia from station to station, the first two stations being about 30 miles apart and the rest about 15 miles apart. All six stations were in Cambodia within ten miles of the South Vietnamese border, three of them north and three south of Route 19. At least four of these stations are in areas that photointerpretation indicates may be used by the Viet Cong. Two are in areas not yet thoroughly analyzed by the interpreters. One infiltrator said he received rice at each station. At the station just north of Route 19 the infiltrator reportedly observed one rice storehouse and, at the station just south of Route 19, two rice storehouses and an underground ammunition dump containing 57-mm. and mortar ammunition. The infiltrator traded with Cambodians along

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the way. At one place he reportedly saw 12 Cambodians carrying rice to the storehouse.

Another Communist prisoner who rallied on 20 October during the fighting at Plei Me also described Communist installations in Cambodia. He said one warehouse was located [redacted] about 800 meters from the Cambodian border at the point where the new road extending south from Route 19 approaches the border. He claimed that the Viet Cong had received permission from the Cambodian authorities to construct buildings in this area. He said that once when an American reporter discovered the road into the area, the Cambodians had told the American that the warehouse was to support the Cambodian military post nearby. Aerial photographs show a triangular strongpoint and buildings that could be warehouses at the end of the road.

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This same prisoner had received orders to carry food (rice, dried fish, powdered milk, etc.) from the warehouse [redacted] across the border to Pleiku, a few miles northwest of the Chu Pong massif. During 15 days about 100 men each made three trips a day carrying 30 kilos per trip, to carry a total of about 135 metric tons to the Viet Cong forces. Another warehouse area in South Vietnam contained ten warehouses of 7 x 10 meters hidden in the forest and 20 thatched huts of about 3 x 5 meters for guard units.

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[redacted] two groups of three traders traveled from South Vietnam to Ratanakiri Province and observed large numbers of Viet Cong troops in Cambodia. The route reportedly traveled by the traders would have taken them near one of the way stations used by the infiltrators, to Lomphat, and near Chu Pong Mountain.

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
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
Figure 3

THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE: ROADS AND ROADWATCH LOCATIONS



**NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA:
Area of Viet Cong Activity**

Figure 4



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